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Abstract  
 
This paper analyses the opposing accounts of ‘the ordinary’ given by Jacques Derrida and Stanley 
Cavell, beginning with their competing interpretations of J. L. Austin¹s thought on ordinary 
language. These accounts are presented as mutually critiquing: Derrida¹s deconstructive method 
poses an effective challenge to Cavell¹s claim that the ordinary is irreducible by further 
philosophical analysis, while, conversely, Cavell¹s valorisation of the human draws attention to a 
residual humanity in Derrida¹s text which Derrida cannot account for. The two philosophers’ 
approaches are, in fact, predicated on each other like the famous Gestalt-image of a vase and two 
faces: they cannot come into focus at the same time, but one cannot appear without the other to 
furnish its background. 
 
 
Derrida and Cavell on J. L. Austin 
 
In the final two sections of his paper ‘Signature Event Context’,1 Derrida criticises the 
work of J. L. Austin (Stanley Cavell’s first influential teacher) from the perspective of 
his deconstructionist position. His target text is Austin’s How to Do Things with 
Words (Austin 1962), a posthumously reconstructed text of Austin’s William James 
Lectures, delivered in 1955 at Harvard University. Austin’s primary aim in these 
lectures is to introduce and classify what he calls ‘speech-acts’. This conception of the 
nature of utterances is designed to overcome the ‘descriptive fallacy’ prevalent in 
Western philosophy: the assumption that all utterances (‘at least in all cases worth 
considering’) are descriptions or representations of essentially ‘inward’ (and thus 
separate and prior) intentions or meaning-content—what Austin calls ‘constative 
utterances’ (5-6). Against this assumption, Austin adduces what he calls ‘performative 
utterances’ (and under which he later subsumes constative utterances [134-135]): 
utterances (such as ‘I do’, spoken by the bridegroom in response to the priest’s 
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question, ‘do you take this woman to be your lawful wedded wife?’) which do not 
merely report an action (conceived as in itself ‘inward and spiritual’), but perform it 
(12-13). The ‘felicity’ (that is, the validity or ‘success’) of such ‘speech-acts’ is 
governed not by their alignment with a truth content prior and external to them, but by 
given criteria, including both an appropriate public context (in the example above, 
their utterance by an appropriate person in response to an appropriate question posed 
by an appropriate official) and a certain personal investment (the performance of the 
utterance freely and with requisite ‘seriousness’) (9). The criterion of ‘seriousness’ 
here refers not to sincerity of intention—on the contrary, Austin asserts that a promise 
made in the appropriate way and context is binding whether or not the speaker intends 
to keep it (10). Rather, it is meant to exclude situations which, in Austin’s view, are 
‘parasitic’ upon ordinary language use, such as stage recitations or jokes (9, 21-22).  
 
From his discussion in How to Do Things with Words, Austin deliberately excludes 
consideration of speech-acts that were not performed freely or with the requisite 
seriousness. He explains the second of these exclusions as follows:    
 
As utterances [as opposed to acts] our performatives are also 
heir to certain other kinds of ill, which infect all utterances…. 
[These] we are deliberately at present excluding. I mean, for 
example, the following: a performative utterance will…be in a 
particular way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or 
if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy…. Language in 
such circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use—ways 
which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All 
this we are excluding from consideration. Our performative 
utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in 
ordinary circumstances. (21-22; Austin’s emphases) 
 
 
Derrida’s criticism of Austin centres on the implications of this act of exclusion, 
which, according to Derrida, involves a ‘metaphysical decision’ that ‘marks’ Austin’s 
entire conception of the ordinary (Derrida 1988, 93). Against this wide-ranging 
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remark, Cavell has rightly emphasised that Austin’s exclusions are not categorical but 
heuristic, and in fact plainly if implicitly refer the reader to the confrontation of the 
problems of responsibility and seriousness attempted in his papers (then circulating in 
manuscript) ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (1956) and ‘Pretending’ (1958).2 Derrida’s 
formulation of his criticism clearly betrays that he is unaware of these pieces (Cavell 
1994, 86, 91). Embarrassing though this exposure may be, however, it ultimately does 
not (as Cavell intends) avert Derrida’s argument, which pivots precisely on Austin’s 
assumption that an exclusion of ‘etiolations’ by an appeal to a prior distinction 
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘parasitic’ uses of language is even provisionally possible.3 As 
Derrida’s reading of Plato (Derrida 1981) makes clear, every utterance, even the most 
‘serious’, is always already marked—indeed, is made possible—by ‘iterability’ 
(Derrida 1982, 315). ‘Iterability’, here, is the elemental capacity of a text or utterance 
to be repeated in the absence of its ‘father’, traditionally imagined as ‘authorising’ and 
thus guaranteeing the meaning / meaningfulness of an utterance by his presence. This 
capability of ‘iteration in alterity’ (Derrida 1982, 315), constitutive of ‘writing’ (in its 
inclusive sense) as a system of conventional or public signs, implies a 
problematisation of ‘intention’ that always already precedes Austin’s distinction 
between ‘seriousness’ and ‘pretending’, rendering these terms useless as criteria of 
what ‘counts’ as a valid speech-act (Derrida 1982, 322). This dilemma, in fact, is 
implicit in Austin’s own admission that ‘all utterances’ are heir to the risk of 
iterability (Austin 1962, 21). Derrida’s criticism of Austin, then, as Glendinning puts 
it, is that rather than ‘pursuing an investigation of the functional structure of 
locutionary acts which shows why this “risk,” qua possibility, is essential to its being 
such an act, his procedure positions it, qua eventuality, as something that transgresses 
the “ordinary circumstances” of language use’ (Glendinning 1998, 39). In other 
words, Derrida criticises Austin for distorting the structure of the ordinary by defining 
the ‘threat’ of iterability as a possibility that might not be realised, rather than as a risk 
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that is essential to what it means to count as an utterance at all (cf. Derrida 1982, 324-
325).
4
  
 
This Derridean critique is strongly reminiscent of Cavell’s understanding of the threat 
of scepticism as integral to the ordinary as such—an understanding which, 
incidentally, marks Cavell’s own chief departure from Austin. This departure is 
signalled in The Claim of Reason by an extended criticism of Austin’s assumption 
that ‘criteria’ provide an insurance against epistemological doubt (see Austin 1961, 
44-84; cf. Cavell 1979, Parts I & II). Contrary to Austin’s assertion, Cavell argues, 
criteria of identification (e.g. that ‘this is a goldfinch’) ensure not the existence but 
only the ‘shape’ of a thing—not that but only what it is (Cavell 1979, 45). Thus, they 
do not unmask but rather make possible pretence and simulation: ‘It is precisely by 
displaying the criteria for being an X, that a pretend X can be recognized as the kind of 
pretend thing it is, namely a pretend X’ (Bearn 1998, 81). The function of appeals to 
ordinary language, in this conception, is not to exclude the possibility of scepticism 
altogether, but to recall the conditions within which alone utterances can function, and 
thus to heal, ‘time after time, place by place’ (Cavell 1985, 531), our desire to escape 
these conditions in pursuit of a total and unambiguous ‘presence’ of the world.  
 
As appears from this brief summary, Cavell’s and Derrida’s critiques of Austin 
converge on a problematisation of speech (or language) which centres on the 
conviction that our life with words is fundamentally determined or shaped by the 
tension between, on the one hand, the ineradicable desire for a complete ‘presence’ of 
self and world and, on the other, the structural impossibility of such ‘presence’. The 
nonetheless conspicuous dissimilarity between their approaches arises chiefly from 
their contrasting location of this ‘desire’, and consequently of the site or methods of 
its alleviation. For Cavell, desire for presence is a quintessentially human propensity, 
arising from our continual struggle to come to terms with the ‘human condition’, 
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marked by limitation and mortality. It thus calls for ‘therapy’, a practice (whether of 
reading, philosophy, or psychoanalysis
5
) which helps the human subject towards an 
‘unattained but attainable self’ (Cavell 2004, 136). For Derrida, by contrast, desire for 
‘presence’ or ‘form’7 is primarily a structural phenomenon, arising from the (apparent 
but ultimately deceptive) tendency of all signifying structures towards a ‘signified’ 
(Derrida 1976, xx). It thus calls for textual ‘deconstruction’, a method which, among 
other things, calls into question the very existence of a desiring or intending subject.  
 
Derrida, Cavell, and the Inheritance of Philosophy 
 
This discrepancy between the terms of Cavell and Derrida’s analyses—related to the 
divergent ways in which they seek to ‘inherit’ philosophy, and the different sets of 
texts from which they chiefly inherit it (Cavell 1988, 15)—has caused in both a 
hesitancy or paralysis in speaking to and about each other’s perspectives. Thus, 
Derrida has maintained an uncharacteristic and remarked-upon reticence vis-à-vis 
Wittgenstein, to which he cryptically alluded in 1999 as his long-standing ‘“problem” 
with Wittgenstein’ (Glendinning 2001, 116).8 Similarly, Cavell has repeatedly 
remarked (or implied) that ‘in our philosophical-literary culture as it stands’, the very 
question whether or not his and Derrida’s concerns are ‘the same’ is ‘unanswerable’ 
(Cavell 1985, 531-532).
9
 This section will follow out these remarks and their 
implications, concluding to a mutual critique that can be seen to be implicit in the 
very ‘incommensurability’ (Cavell 1985, 532) of Cavell and Derrida’s approaches, 
and which, in turn, opens out towards a critique of both.  
 
Cavell and Derrida met at a ‘philosophical conversation’ organised in Paris in the 
summer of 1970 between Derrida and a number of English-speaking philosophers, 
one session of which was intended to (but ultimately did not) deal with Cavell’s early 
essay in defence of Austin, ‘Must We Mean What We Say?’ (Cavell 1976, 1-43). 
Despite this occasion (which required Derrida to read at least parts of Must We Mean 
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What We Say?, and prompted Cavell to attempt, at the least, L’écriture et la 
différence
10), Derrida never remarked on Cavell’s work in a published context.11 
Conversely, Cavell did not read Derrida with any systematicity until more than ten 
years later, and, with the exception of a lecture responding to Derrida’s critique of 
Austin, has commented only hesitantly and fragmentarily on him, asserting that ‘to 
locate and trace out the…resemblances [between the writings of Derrida and me], 
along with their companion disparities, is not my business, [and] if this work of 
contrast has profit in it, others are better placed to realize it than I’ (Cavell 1988, 
130).
12
   
 
In ‘The Division of Talent’ (Cavell 1985), Cavell tests this sense of resistance. He 
begins by raising the question whether his own tendency to say that human reason and 
communication ‘rest upon’ nothing more or less than ‘shared routes’ of interest, 
appeal and response (Cavell 1985, 530; emphasis added)—what Wittgenstein calls 
‘forms of life’—implies that human reason has or that it does not have a foundation, 
concluding that the tension in this question, ‘as it stands’, is irreducible (530-531). 
Cavell then asks whether this continuing tension is the same as that which Derrida 
‘apparently wishes to maintain on what seems the same issue’, namely Derrida’s 
question about ‘the foundation and the abyss of reason’ (532), but immediately 
problematises this query: 
 
Is it the same issue? Or is there this decisive difference, that, 
following Wittgenstein, I am saying that explanations come to an 
end somewhere, each in its time and place [cf. Philosophical 
Investigations §1], to be discovered philosophically, let us say, 
time after time, place by place. Whereas Derrida is following the 
path this opposes, or reverses, suggesting that there is a 
somewhere, as if some metaphysical space, at which all 
explanations come to an end, or else there is nowhere they end. 
Say he follows this path only to undermine it. Is this different? 
(Cavell 1985, 531) 
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The immediate point of posing this further question, according to Cavell, is that the 
attempted inquiry whether or not his own concern regarding the ground of human 
reason ‘is or is not the same’ as Derrida’s is ‘unanswerable in our philosophical-
literary culture as it stands’ (531-532). 
 
However, the distinctive formulation of Cavell’s further question of ‘sameness’ offers 
a more concrete sense of the character of the professed ‘incommensurability’ of his 
and Derrida’s concerns. Both enact a continual resistance to false hopes for 
‘completeness’; the contrast (in the description above) lies in the place and role of 
images in this philosophical practice. Derrida’s reading method centres on the 
subversion or deconstruction of self-presenting images. For Derrida, language is 
governed by a version of the paradox of the one and the many. Systems of 
signification inherently tend toward a signified. However, because an actual, 
completely self-present signified could never break out of its self-enclosedness into a 
system of signification, there can be no such signified at the end of a chain of 
signification (see Derrida 1982, 329; Cavell 1994, 64). ‘Inheriting’ philosophy, in the 
deconstructionist tradition, therefore involves maintaining, in paradoxical 
simultaneity, images of perfection and an acknowledgement of their hollowness. This 
acceptance of paradox necessitates writing sous rature (‘under erasure’), a practice 
that attempts to capture both the necessity and the impossibility of using the ordinary 
words of our language(s) (see Derrida 1979, xx).  
 
For Cavell, by contrast, the ‘inheritance’ of philosophy (consciously received from 
other writers and passed on to his reader) involves accepting images, in their 
pertinence as well as inadequacy, as one’s own constructions. The paradigmatic 
example of this is the image of the Kantian ‘line’, which figures prominently in 
Cavell’s writings. A particularly instructive example is his 1988 In Quest of the 
Ordinary. Here, Cavell seeks to unsettle the ‘Kantian settlement’ with scepticism by 
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questioning Kant’s assertion that there is a realm of ‘the thing in itself’ closed off to 
the human mind (Cavell 1988, 47). This assertion, according to Cavell, does not (as 
Kant intends) exclude scepticism once and for all, but rather repeats or encourages the 
move of the sceptic by suggesting that the ground (or foundation) of human 
experience is inaccessible to humans: ‘The beginning of skepticism is the insinuation 
of absence, of a line, or limitation, hence the creation of want, or desire’ (Cavell 
1988, 51, emphasis added). This is facilitated by the paradoxicality of human life with 
language (Cavell 1988, 40). On the one hand, language, as a quintessentially public 
medium, always precedes and exceeds individual speakers, involving them in 
meanings and commitments they can never fully control or even survey. On the other 
hand, language is the medium or environment with or in which humans express their 
most personal selves (Cavell 1988, 40). 
 
In other words, there both is and is not a Kantian ‘line’. Partly as a natural 
consequence of their life with language, people are apt to believe in the existence of a 
separate realm of ‘objective’, ‘external’ knowledge unrelated to their own choices and 
intentions (and thus both determinative of their lives and, if it could be penetrated, 
able to confer complete knowledge and control). To people in this mindset, the 
experienced inability to penetrate this realm is taken as proof of the inferiority of 
common knowledge, sometimes leading to the assertion that we can never have 
sufficient certainty to trust in the world. However, Cavell argues, what seems like a 
different, alien realm is really only the ordinary realm of words or language as it 
appears when a speaker has disowned it. If we do not accept our words, in all their 
ambiguity and prior-ness to any individual speaker, as inescapably our own, Cavell 
warns, we violently externalise language and thus create the supposedly inaccessible 
realm of the ‘thing in itself’. In other words, we impose language on ourselves as fate 
and tyranny: ‘Fate is the exercise of [the] capacity [to give law to ourselves], so that 
fate is at once the promise and the refusal of freedom’ (Cavell 1988, 40). The 
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consequence is not that the world vanishes so much as that it dies, growing cold and 
rigid like the Polar Sea in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (which Cavell reads as an 
allegory of this problematic in Cavell 1988, 46-8). This Polar Sea beyond or below 
what Coleridge calls ‘the line’ evokes the ‘definite, as it were, frozen, structure’, the 
‘forced’ or ‘driven’ quality, of ordinary life as experienced by those who have not 
fully acknowledged their words and relations as their own (Cavell 1988, 48). 
 
Image and Play 
 
Cavell explicitly evokes the contrast between this approach to images and Derrida’s in 
a reflection on the question of ‘inheriting’ language, and particularly of the 
importance of ‘play’ (conceived in very different terms by Cavell and Derrida) as key 
to the practice of inheritance: 
 
[T]he play of philosophy, as in the humor or frivolity of Austin 
and of Wittgenstein, is [a ‘field on which the contest of 
inheritance is shown to be continued, or continuable, within each 
breast, each text’]—as if the inheriting of language is itself 
formed of the willingness for play, and continues as long as the 
willingness continues…. By contrast, the play in 
deconstructionist flights more often feels, to my ear or for my 
taste, somewhat forced, wilful, as if in reaction to a picture of a 
completed inheritance, as if to undo its trauma. (Cavell 1988, 
132; emphasis added) 
 
 
According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein and Austin’s texts (as well as Cavell’s 
own) portray and invite ‘inheritance’ as a never-completed process of reading (Cavell 
1988, 14), characterised by an ever-renewed and developing response to the partial 
and multifaceted images offered by the writer as reflections and examinations of the 
ordinary (see e.g. Cavell 1988, 33, 74). To ‘receive’ these images (including those 
offered by Cavell here of ‘contest’, ‘field’, and ‘play’) responsively—to be ready to 
‘play’ (along) with them—is to participate in this reflection, and thus to inherit and 
develop the community they examine. In Derrida’s texts, by contrast, ‘play’ is a 
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conscious strategy for subverting the hegemony of images of completion, by exposing 
them precisely as images or signs, and thus as governed by the logic of difference and 
deferral (différance). In Cavell’s reading of Derrida, this strategy does not (as Derrida 
ostensibly intends) dissolve the primacy of the human subject who inherits language, 
but merely reflects a particular choice by that subject: it is a means of making room 
for oneself as inheriting these images precisely by announcing that that inheritance is 
not yet, and can never yet be, complete. This way of inheriting language, however, is 
problematic in that its underlying conception of inheritance as intrinsically a matter of 
‘undoing a trauma’ implicitly perpetuates (the category of) trauma as a necessary 
condition for doing philosophy.
13
  
 
Cavell thus comes to suspect that deconstruction, far from constituting a sophisticated 
version of inheritance, is in fact a refusal fully to participate in the inheritance of 
language, which involves accepting responsibility for our words despite or within an 
awareness that our capacity (and willingness) to ‘mean what we say’ is limited and in 
many cases inadequate, and thus requires (without being able to guarantee) sympathy 
and forgiveness from those with whom we engage. Scepticism—the repudiation of 
this risky and incompletable business—is, for Cavell, an ever-present threat or 
temptation whose continual overcoming is a necessary part of the process of 
inheritance. From this perspective, the deconstructionist’s unwillingness to let go of 
(the category of) trauma betokens an abnegation of this responsibility which involves 
a refusal to engage adequately with the threat or ‘truth’ of scepticism:  
 
To decide that [the meaning of a word or expression is] 
undecidable would be to decide that the conclusion of skepticism 
is true, that we never know so certainly but that we can doubt. 
This, to my mind, trivializes the claim of the skeptic, whose 
power lies not in some decision, but in his apparent discovery of 
the ineluctable fact that we cannot know; at the same time, it 
theatricalizes the threat, or the truth, of skepticism: that it names 
our wish (and the possibility of our wishing) to strip ourselves of 
the responsibility we have in meaning (or in failing to mean) one 
thing, or one way, rather than another. (Cavell 1988, 135)  
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Cavell’s claim, here, is not, as Gordon Bearn claims, that Derrida is himself a sceptic 
(Bearn 1998, 76), but that Derrida sees himself as beyond the question of scepticism: 
that he does ‘not participat[e] in but…claim[s] too knowing a place in the sphere of 
the anxiety of identity and existence that philosophy is captivated by’ (Cavell 1994, 
123). The sceptic ‘theatricalizes’ the ordinary by treating it as a ‘spatialized’ present 
surveyable from a distance. Derrida, according to Cavell, ‘theatricalizes’ this gesture 
of theatricalization itself: he regards the sceptical position as merely another human 
posture vis-à-vis the implacable system of signs that takes its course through and 
beyond us. This, Cavell protests by means of a quibble, is to underrate the human 
involvement in this system: it is to insist that the ‘condition of possibility of [ordinary 
words] is simultaneously the condition of their impossibility’ (Derrida 1988, 20, as 
cited in Cavell 1994, 119), rather than acknowledging that the ‘conditions of 
impossibility [of ordinary words] (to block skepticism, to grant presence) are 
simultaneously their conditions of possibility (to recount a world, one shared)’ (Cavell 
1994, 119-120).
14
 On this latter perspective, iterability is itself a burden of the ‘human 
condition’ (Cavell 1988, 37), part of its (ever-threatening) tragedy and (hoped-for) 
comedy (Cavell 1994, 87; Cavell 1988, 9): 
 
 
[Austin’s theory of pretending] betokens about utterance or about 
action that they can suffer, say, imitation (to take that title for the 
iterative). It betokens, roughly, that human utterances are 
essentially vulnerable to insincerity and that the realization that 
we may never know whether others are sincere (I do not exclude 
the first person) is apt to become unbearable. (Cavell 1994, 92-
93) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This account seems to provide a viable alternative to Derrida’s deconstructionist 
vision. While Derrida aims to expose the human subject as an illusion or ‘effect’ of 
the impossible ideal of self-presence and ‘form’, Cavell’s account aims to show that 
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this ideal is in fact an ‘effect’, a self-misinterpretation, of humans in their ineluctably 
social and lingual existence. 
 
However, Cavell’s account also elides a number of questions necessary to shoring up 
his vision against deconstruction. After affirming that ‘the world is Eden 
enough…and what is more, all the world there is’ (Cavell 1988, 52), Cavell comments 
on the ineliminable difficulties arising from the simultaneously public and personal 
character of language as follows:  
 
Risks and error are inherent in the human, part of what we 
conceive human life to be, part of our unsurveyable 
responsibilities in speech and in evil (in, as Descartes put it, our 
being provided with free will); and this condemnation to an 
unsurveyable freedom is not well described by saying that we 
can never, or can only in a certain class of cases, be certain. If 
the earth opens and swallows me up, this need not prove that my 
trust in it was misplaced. What better place for my trust could 
there be? (The world was my certainty. Now my certainty is 
dead.) (Cavell 1988, 52) 
 
 
This statement has intense emotional appeal. However, this appeal conceals the fact 
that Cavell’s account does not provide the conditions for using either of its key 
terms—‘trust’ and ‘responsibility’—in the way he wishes to use them. (He speaks, as 
it were, outside his own language game.) Cavell himself affirms that the possible 
meanings of language always precede and exceed the resources and intentions of the 
individual speaker. As I have argued elsewhere, the demand that the speaker 
nevertheless accept ‘ownership’ of his words—an acceptance that involves, according 
to Cavell, ‘unsurveyable responsibilities’—is nearly non-sensical (see Wolfe 2007, 
391-4). Similarly, Cavell’s defence of trust in the face of the world’s 
untrustworthiness involves two separate convictions: first, that we are beings who can 
only function by investing ourselves; secondly, that the world is all there is. From the 
conjunction of the two follows that we must invest ourselves in the world even if it 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (2013): 250-268 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
262 
                                                                                                          Judith Wolfe 
 
turns out to be treacherous, because there is nothing else to do (viz., if we know 
ourselves at all, we know ourselves as beings in the world). However (pace Cavell), 
the fact that the world can thus disappoint us must mean that our capacity to trust 
exceeds our ownership of the world, and is therefore not confinable to it. 
 
This is suggested by Cavell’s own observation that the Romantics, in contesting 
Kant’s settlement, felt compelled to embrace various forms of animism. Similarly, 
Emerson argues (though Cavell consistently ignores) that the ordinary is trustworthy 
precisely because the self is not ‘just’ itself, but is our only medium for reflecting or 
participating in something higher (‘God’ [Emerson 1965, 258], ‘the Over-Soul’ [280], 
‘Unity’, ‘Wisdom’, and ‘the eternal ONE’ [all 281]): ‘Great men have always … 
[trusted] their perception that the absolutely trustworthy was seated at their heart, 
working through them … [a] transcendent destiny’ (259). 
 
In summary, Cavell’s appeal to the concepts of ‘trust’ and ‘responsibility’—as, later, 
of ‘authenticity’ (Cavell 2004, preface)—exceeds the resources that his vision of the 
ordinary provides: it is not grounded in, but itself shapes that vision. It thus leaves us 
with the question of the status of these ideals. If, as Derrida asserts, the image of 
subjecthood (to which the ideals of trust and responsibility conceptually belong) is 
inherently false, then Cavell’s account, as it stands, is not able to withstand 
deconstruction: it is, as Derrida claims (and Cavell denies), not independent from but 
predicated on ideals of perfection (cf. Cavell 2004, 3).  
 
However, Cavell’s ‘ideal’ in turn contains an element that questions Derrida’s 
conception of the ‘transcendental signified’. Cavell’s ideal of subjecthood, 
characterised by the terms ‘trust’ and ‘responsibility’, is not (like Derrida’s) monadic, 
but inherently communicative and relational: it is not wholly external to 
‘signification’, but on the contrary realised within and by it. In summary, if Derrida 
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can criticise Cavell, Cavell in turn draws attention to the irreducible presence of the 
human subject in Derrida. If, as Geoffrey Bennington writes, the structure of writing 
‘in its very principle exceeds the resources of any humanist analysis’ (Bennington and 
Derrida 1999, 56), then human persons, in their relatedness, also exceed the resources 
of deconstruction. Cavell and Derrida’s visions, in other words, appear predicated on 
each other like the famous Gestalt-image of a vase and two faces: they cannot come 
into focus at the same time, but one cannot appear without the other to furnish its 
background. The questions this raises for our conception both of their own 
philosophical positions and for the tradition of thought about ‘the ordinary’ that both 
inherit in competing ways, have yet to be fully formulated.    
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NOTES 
 
 
1  The essay was originally published in Marges de la philosophie (Derrida 1972b). It was translated 
twice: by Samuel Webster and Henry Sussman for the first issue of Glyph (1977), where it was 
published together with a reply by John Searle; and by Alan Bass for the English translation of 
Marges (Derrida 1982). The first translation was subsequently reprinted, with a reply to Searle and 
a later response to a further piece by Searle (but without Searle’s essays), in Limited Inc. (Derrida 
1988). My citations are to this last volume. 
 
2
  The papers are reprinted in Austin 1961, 123-152 and 201-219, respectively. 
 
3
  A similar defence to Cavell’s, on this point, is attempted by Searle in his original response to 
Derrida. The insufficiency of this defence is noted in Bearn 1998, 75 and Glendinning 1998, 38-39, 
and is also made evident by Derrida’s later reading of ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (in Glendinning 2001, 
118). Cavell also advances a second, more substantial objection to Derrida’s critique of Austin, 
which will be discussed below. 
 
4
  For a wonderfully lucid discussion of this deconstruction of the opposition between the ‘serious’ 
and the ‘non-serious’, see Glendinning 1998, 39-40. 
 
5
  On philosophy and psychoanalysis, see, among many other texts, Cavell 2004. 
 
6
  Quoting an unreferenced statement from Emerson. 
 
7
  Henry Staten discusses ‘form’ as the ‘principle of intelligibility’, and consequently as an alternative 
description of Derrida’s target (pertinent particularly in light of his early readings of Aristotle and 
Husserl), in Staten 1985, chapter 1. 
 
8
  The remark was made in response to a direct question about Derrida’s continued silence about 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations, posed by Stephen Mulhall at the Ratio conference 1999 (University 
of Reading), entitled Arguing with Derrida. Although Mulhall’s question specifically included 
Cavell, Derrida did not either in this or in any other published context remark on Cavell’s work. 
 
9
  This is the chief shortcoming of Gordon Bearn’s (almost unique) attempt to analyse the relation 
between Cavell and Derrida (Bearn 1998). By simply assimilating Cavellian terms to Derrida’s 
(very different) terminology, Bearn undermines his own (limited) attempt to gauge the tension 
between their approaches. Other studies relating Cavell’s and Derrida’s work (in various ways) are 
Fischer 1989 and Bell 2004; both, however, are primarily attempts to extend Cavell’s work to other 
domains, namely literary scepticism (exemplified, according to Fischer, by post-structuralists such 
as Paul de Man, Stanley Fish and Derrida himself) and literary theory (including post-colonialism, 
multiculturalism, and general cultural criticism), respectively. 
 
10
  Cavell wrote about this meeting in a letter to Michael Fischer: ‘I was very impressed in the 
exchanges I had with Derrida those few days that summer, and we got along personally, I thought, 
notably well, ending on an almost familiar basis. He seemed to have read at least some of Must We 
Mean…?...and gave me a collection of his books and monographs’ (Fischer 1989, 143 n.1). Cavell 
confesses that he tried to read L’écriture et la différence after this, but found the French too intricate 
(loc. cit.). See also Cavell 1994, 57. 
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11
  See endnotes 8 and 10. 
 
12
  The lecture (entitled ‘Counter-Philosophy and the Pawn of Voice’) was given in 1993 as part of the 
Jerusalem-Harvard lectures; it is printed in Cavell 1994, 53-127, and partly recapitulated in Cavell 
1995, 42-65. Cavell’s further comments on Derrida are primarily found in Cavell 1985 and Cavell 
1988, 130-136 (‘Postscript A: Skepticism and a Word concerning Deconstruction’). For a more 
detailed history of Cavell’s reluctance to speak about the relation between his and Derrida’s work, 
see Bearn 1998, 65-67. 
 
13
  This reading of deconstruction would align Derrida with Augustine and Cavell with Wittgenstein in 
Stephen Mulhall’s reading of the opening of the Philosophical Investigations (Mulhall 2001, 29-36; 
see also Glendinning 2001, 109-116). 
 
14
  From a deconstructionist perspective, Cavell’s reversal of Derrida’s dictum regarding the possibility 
or impossibility of ordinary words (Cavell 1994, 119-120, cited above) merely avoids, but does not 
deflect Derrida’s critique. Cavell’s reversal depends entirely on a grammatical shift of the word 
‘(im-)possibility’ from an intransitive to a transitive use, effecting a silent shift of the terms of 
interrogation. While Derrida’s remark on the possibility/impossibility of ordinary words aims to 
problematise the integrity or conditions of existence of those words themselves, Cavell’s (slightly 
odd) use of ‘possibility’ and ‘impossibility’ in the sense of ‘capability’ and ‘incapability’ 
presupposes the integrity of ordinary words and questions merely their scope. This is apt to seem a 
mere evasion of Derrida’s critique. 
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